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Abstract – Incessantly extending possibilities of safety 
PLCs allows usage not only in process level control but 
also in higher level of control. It means, that complex 
distributed control systems can be created. In case that 
safety functions are realised by these systems, 
architecture of control system can have an influence on 
safety and dependability parameters of functions. This 
paper deals with the influence of architecture and 
system realisation of safety functions on dependability 
and safety of these functions.  
Keywords-safety PLC; safety integrity level; safety 
function; failure probability; dangerous failure rate  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Control system can realise various functions. If a 
failure of some function could result in a significant 
damage to human health, the environment or major 
material damages, then the system is called safety 
related control system (SRCS) and function which can 
cause damage is called a safety function (SF). Most of 
industrial applications can be divided into common 
control functions and safety functions. Also control 
systems for industry are adapted for this fact. Mainly 
safety PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) which 
has capabilities to realise common control functions 
and also safety functions are used. 
Safety PLC are modular control systems with 
many different communication interfaces and 
possibility of safety related communication. Relatively 
complex, distributed control systems can be realised 
thanks to wide communication possibilities. Using 
safety related communication, the realisation of 
distributed SF is also possible. 
For realisation of SF (safety function) it is 
necessary to make safety analysis of this function for 
evaluation of SIL (Safety Integrity Level - Definition 
of SIL is described in [1]). Importance of 
dependability parameters evaluation is higher for more 
complex applications (e.g. distributed safety function). 
Architecture and way of realisation of distributed 
SRCS can have influence on safety and dependability 
parameters of realised SF. It is important for 
architecture composition to take into account the 
minimal required values of all defined parameters.  
This paper deals with analysis of SRCS 
architecture and way of SRCS realisation on safety 
and dependability of realised SF. 
II. SAFETY OF SAFETY FUNCTION 
Required parameters of determined SIL must be 
respected during design and realization of centralised 
or distributed SRCS. SIL is determined on base of risk 
analysis. Result of risk analysis is risk identification 
and proposal of risk reduction measures. Measures can 
have technical or non-technical character (e.g. 
organization measure). Safety functions are technical 
measures for risks reduction related with controlled 
process. Risk reduction realised by safety function is 
directly proportional to SIL. If multiple safety 
functions are realised by the same SRCS, then SIL 
must be determined for each safety function.  
SIL specifies the random hardware and systematic 
failure tolerance of safety function. Systematic safety 
integrity is non-quantifiable part of safety integrity and 
with respect to scope of this paper will not be 
discussed further. More detailed information about 
systematic safety integrity can be found in [2, 3]. 
Random hardware safety integrity can be 
quantitatively evaluated based on probability 
calculation. Standard [1] evaluates reached SIL 
according to one of two parameters. For systems with 
low demand mode, SIL evaluation is determined on 
SF average probability of dangerous failure. For 
systems with high demand mode SIL is determined on 
SF average frequency of dangerous failure. 
Low demand mode is defined as safety function, 
which is executed only on demand and occurs less 
than one per year only. Most of safety functions work 
in high or continuous demand mode. This mode is also 
considered in this paper. 
III. DEPENDABILITY OF SAFETY FUNCTION 
Dependability is a general property of the object 
which ich based on ability to perform required 
functions in determined range of specified values and 
during specified time. An object can be considered 
a whole system or its elements. If these objects are 
parts of SRCS, which cooperate to realise the safety 
function, we can consider the dependability of safety 
function. Determination of this term is necessary for 
comparison of various SRCS architecture and their 
influence on relevant properties. 
In the international electrotechnics dictionary [4] 
dependability is defined as a summary of terms used 
 for description of availability and factors, which have 
influence on availability, maintainability and 
providing of maintenance.  
Suitable parameters for quantitative evaluation of 
safety function dependability are various dependability 
indicators. For example: function of immediate 
availability, coefficient of mean availability or 
coefficient of asymptotic availability. Coefficient of 
average availability is an average value of immediate 
availability in a defined time range ሺݐଵǡ ݐଶሻ. 
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where ܣሺݐሻ is function of immediate availability. 
In case, that some relevant conditions are met, for 
example, constant failure rate and restoration rate, then 
we can assume: 
ܣ ൌ ெ௎்
ெ௎்ାெ஽்
, (2) 
where MUT is mean up time and MDT is mean down 
time. 
It is evident based on (2), that availability is 
dependent not only on parameters of SRCS but also on 
external parameters (e.g. time of unusability – 
dependent on recovery time, stock of replacement 
parts, etc.). This is the reason why quantitative 
parameters are more suitable (based on SRCS 
parameters only) for comparison of architectures. 
Suitable parameter for evaluation is for example 
probability of failure-free operation or failure 
probability. We can assume: 
ܴሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ܨሺݐሻ, (3) 
where ܴሺݐሻ is probability of failure-free operation and 
ܨሺݐሻ is failure probability. 
Supposing of exponential distribution of failure 
occurrence (generally accepted for electronic devices), 
failure probability can be described by: 
ܨሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ݁ିߣݐ, (4) 
where ߣ is failure rate of monitored object. 
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF SRCS 
A. Centralised architecture of SRCS 
Example of centralised SRCS architecture is 
shown in fig. 1. More safety functions can be realised 
by this SRCS. When we assume, that dangerous 
failure of any element which cooperates on realisation 
of safety function will cause dangerous failure of SF 
(we can assume serial model of system elements), then 
dangerous failure rate can be express using equation: 
ߣௌி
஽ ൌ σ ߣ௜
஽௡
௜ୀଵ , (5) 
where ߣ௜஽  is dangerous failure rate of element i which 
cooperate on SF realisation and n is count of elements 
which realises SF. 
 
Figure 1.  Example of centralised SRCS architecture 
When SRCS is realising multiple SF, it is obvious 
that some elements (such as control logic) will be used 
to realize more than one SF. In this case we have to 
assume more pessimistic approach of evaluation, and 
dangerous failure rate is therefore assumed as a sum of 
separately determined dangerous failure rate of each 
realised SF. This issue is described in [5]. 
Equation (5) does not include some necessary 
components which have no influence on safety with 
assumption of correct application of used parts, (e.g. 
power supply).  
Failure probability of SF which is realised by 
centralised architecture can be described by: 
ܨௌிሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ς ሺͳ െ ܨ௜ሺݐሻሻ௡௜ୀଵ , (6) 
where ܨ௜ሺݐሻ is failure probability of element i which 
cooperate on SF realisation and n is count of elements, 
which are realising SF. 
Assuming that exponential distribution of failure 
occurrence has been used, formula (6) can be modified 
using formula (4): 
ܨௌிሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ς ݁ିߣ೔ݐ௡௜ୀଵ , (7) 
where ߣ௜ is failure rate of element i which cooperate 
for SF realisation. In equation (7), unlike equation (5), 
it is necessary to consider all elements of SRCS (such 
as power supply) which are necessary for SF 
realisation. The reason is that failure of each of these 
parts will cause SF failure (does not matter that some 
of theseare not dangerous). 
ߣ௜ ൌ
ଵ
ெ்஻ி೔
, (8) 
where ܯܶܤܨ௜  is mean time between failure of used 
elements. 
B. Distributed architecture of SRCS 
In the fig. 2 we can see example of distributed 
SRCS architecture. Generally, this SRCS can be 
complex, multilevel distributed SRCS. For simplicity, 
in the fig. 2, only two-level architecture is shown. 
Input and output modules of safety PLC used in 
process level (sPLC1, sPLC2, ..., sPLCn) are directly 
cooperating with controlled technology. Safety PLC in 
higher control level (sPLCc) realises coordination of 
each task realised by PLC in lower level. 
Architecture of SRCS is not dependent on realised 
SF only, but also on application of safety PLC for 
realisation of common control functions (safety non-
relevant functions). Safety PLC can execute complex 
F-DI F-DO F-CPU 
Safety PLC 
Production cell 
 control functions as is [6] (as standard PLC) and safety 
functions at the same time.  
Because of necessity to evaluate safety and 
dependability parameters of SF realised by distributed 
SRCS, logical relation among elements used for SF 
realisation must be known. Logical relations can 
depends on specific properties given by manufacturers 
of safety PLC. Logical relation can depends also on 
used communication interface or other specific 
requirement of realisation (e.g. galvanic separation of 
communication networks). Example of logical 
relations among sPLC is shown in fig. 2 by arrows 
with dashed lines.    
 
Figure 2.  Two level distributed SRCS 
We assume, that architecture shown in the fig. 2 
realise SF. In case of execution request in a place A 
(e.g. pushed emergency button ES1) safety function 
will put a machine into safe state in a place B (e.g. 
disconnection a motor from power supply in cell n). 
For realisation of SF mentioned above, safety 
related communication between sPLC1 and sPLCn is 
unavoidable. This communication is possible by two 
ways. First possible way is communication in process 
level realised among sPLC1 - sPLC2 - ... – sPLCn 
(this realisation of safety function will be labelled as 
SF1). In this case the direct communication between 
sPLC1 and sPLCn could be the best solution. 
Unfortunately, this communication is impossible in 
practice, because of communication among other cells 
requires more communication elements (e.g. galvanic 
separation of networks). Application of additional 
elements, to allow communicate every cell with each 
other could be too expensive.  
Second way of realisation is using elements in 
higher level of architecture. Data exchange is provided 
by communication realised via sPLC1 – sPLCc – 
sPLCn (this realisation of safety function will be 
labelled as SF2). 
In case that SF1 and SF2 are realised, dangerous 
failure rate can be determined by (5), what is given by 
serial model of used components for SF realisation. To 
the serial model must be included communication 
dangerous failure rate. Failure probability of SF can be 
determined by formula (6) or rather (7).  
Another case of data exchange realisation is when 
we use communication via two parallel ways (safety 
function realised by this way will be labelled as SFK). 
Reason why realise this solution is improving 
availability of SF. Advantage of this solution is that 
not additional hardware is required. Higher availability 
is reached thanks to software modification based on 
logical sum of received values in place B. 
Failure probability of SFK can be described by 
block diagram shown in fig. 3. This block diagram 
assume that modular system based on Simatic S7-1500 
will communicate via Profinet and galvanic separation 
realised by PN/PN couplers has been used.  
 
Figure 3.  Failure occurence block diagram of two level distributed 
SRCS 
Block description of blocks used in fig. 3 is in the 
tab. 1. 
TABLE I.  DESCRIPTION OF USED BLOCKS IN FIG.3 
Block label 
without 
number 
Block description Failure rate 
symbol 
ES Emergency stop button ߣாௌଵ 
PW Power supply ߣ௉ௐ 
CPU Central processing unit of sPLC ߣ஼௉௎ 
F-DI Input module of sPLC ߣி஽ூ 
PNc PN/PN coupler which separate 
networks between process and 
control level 
ߣ௉ே 
PN PN/PN coupler which separate 
networks on the process level 
ߣ௉ே 
F-DO Output module of sPLC ߣܨܦܱ 
OC Output circuit ߣܱܥ 
 
It is possible to express equation for failure 
probability calculation of SFK using block diagram in 
the fig. 3: 
ܨௌி௄ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ൫ͳ െ ܨ஺ሺݐሻ൯൫ͳ
െ ܨ஻ሺݐሻܨ஼ሺݐሻ൯൫ͳ െ ܨ஽ሺݐሻ൯ǡ 
(9) 
where ܨ஺, ܨ஻, ܨ஼ and  ܨ஽ is failure probability of A, B, 
C and D blocks. 
Failure probability of A, B and D blocks can be 
determined by formula (6), or (7) because, each block 
consists of elements. Each element consists of parts 
which also use serial model of connection.  
Supposing of identical elements used for 
realisation of SFK in each cell, failure probability of 
block C (fig. 3) can be described by (10). 
 
PW1 CPU1 F-DI1 ES1 
PW4 CPU4 PNc1 PNc2 
PW2 CPU2 PN1 PW(n-1) CPU(n-1) PN(n-2) PN(n-1) 
PWn CPUn F-DOn OC 
Block A 
Block B 
Block C 
Block D 
... 
Cell 1 
sPLC1 sPLC2 sPLCn 
sPLCc 
ES1 ES2 
Cell 2 Cell n 
ESn 
... Process level 
Control level 
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ሺ௡ିଵሻ
ǡ  
(10) 
where ܨ௉ே, ܨ௉ௐ a ܨ஼௉௎ are failure probabilities of PN, 
PW and CPU blocks. 
When we assume identical elements for each cell and 
also exponential distribution of failure occurrence. 
Using formula (7), (9) and (10) formula for calculation 
of SFK failure probability can be derived (explanation 
of symbols used in (11) is shown in tab.1.): 
ܨௌி௄ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ
݁ିሺఒಶೄభାఒಷವ಺ାఒಷವೀାఒೀ಴ାଷሺఒುೈାఒ಴ುೆሻାଶఒುಿሻ௧ െ
݁ିሺఒಶೄభାఒಷವ಺ାఒಷವೀାఒೀ಴ାሺ௡ିଵሻఒುಿା௡ሺఒುೈାఒ಴ುೆሻሻ௧ ൅
݁ିሺఒಶೄభାఒಷವ಺ାఒಷವೀାఒೀ಴ାሺ௡ାଵሻሺఒುಿାఒುೈାఒ಴ುೆሻሻ௧. 
(11)  
Danger failure rate of SFK can be determined also 
by (5). It is important to assume all used elements in 
each way of communication because of fact, that each 
element providing information transfer (in first and 
also second way) can cause danger state. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the fig. 4 waveforms of SF1 failure probability 
(curve 4) and SF2 for n=4, n=5 a n=7 (curves 3, 2 a 1) 
are shown. 
 
Figure 4.  Failure probability of SF1 and SF2 
In the fig. 5 waveform of SF2 failure probability is 
shown. In the graph, 6 curves shows failure probability 
for n=4, n=5 and n=7 (curves 3, 2, 1) and SFK, for 
n=4, n=5 a n=7 (curves 6, 5, 4). 
 
Figure 5.  Failure probability of SF2 and SFK 
In the tab. 2, we can see danger failure rate of SF1, 
SF2 and SFK (it is average rate of dangerous SF failure 
for 20 years - it means, during lifetime of SRCS). 
TABLE II.  AVERAGE DANGER FAILURE RATE  OF SF DURING 
LIFETIME OF SRCS 
Safety function n ߣௌி஽  
SF1 - 1,29.10-8h-1 
SF2 4 1,49.10-8h-1 
SF2 5 1,69.10-8h-1 
SF2 7 2,09.10-8h-1 
SFK 4 1,69.10-8h-1 
SFK 5 1,89.10-8h-1 
SFK 7 2,29.10-8h-1 
Parameters used for calculation:  availability 
factors according to [7], output circuit with two 
contactors without feedback according to [8] and 
safety factors include dangerous failure rate of 
communication according to [9]. With safety related 
communications deals detailed [10, 11]. 
VI. EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Waveforms shown in fig. 4 and fig. 5 compares 
dependability parameters of SF which are realised by 
different ways and by distributed SRCS with various 
complexity.  
In the graph shown in fig. 4 it is evident that higher 
count of used cells in process level (fig. 2) will raise 
failure probability of SF2. Reason of this occurrence is 
higher count of elements which can occurs failure of 
SF2. 
In the fig. 5 we can see redundancy influence on 
failure probability of SFK. This influence is compared 
with equally complex distributed SRCS as used for 
realisation of SF2. We must remember that it is 
realisation of the same SF by different ways. It is not 
primary target to create redundancy but only better use 
of exists hardware and software resources of 
distributed SRCS. In this example, redundancy is 
partial only (not all components of SRCS are 
redundant). It means that by suitable using of 
hardware and software resources only we can improve 
dependability of distributed SRCS. 
It is necessary to keep on mind, that we realise SF 
and primary required aspect is safety. In the tab. 2 
influence of each SF solutions on dangerous failure 
rate is shown.  Because of facts mentioned above, 
safety parameters are worsening with higher count of 
elements which realises SF. It means, that for 
improving of dependability parameters we can worsen 
safety parameters. In any case, all required parameters 
must reach minimal required value. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Realisation of SF by distributed SRCS has specific 
properties which must be taken into account during the 
selection of suitable architecture and way of SF 
realisation. In general, when the distributed SRCS is 
more complex, more ways of SF realisation exist. All 
required parameters must meet the minimum specified 
level for the considered architecture and solution 
choice. This paper deals with evaluation of safety and 
dependability parameters for safety functions only. 
Another important parameter, which has an influence 
on safety of SF is response time. The approach to 
realize a SF by a distributed SRCS with respect of 
response time is shown in [12]. 
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